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Abstract 
Research examining the relation between explicit and im- 
plicit forms of  memory has generated a great deal of  evidence 
concerning the issue of  multiple memory systems. This article 
focuses on an extensively studied implicit memory phenome- 
non, known as direct or repetition priming, and examines the 
hypothesis that  priming  effects  on various  tasks  reflect the 
operation of  a perceptual representation system (PRSta  class 
of  cortically based subsystems that operate  at  a presemantic 
level and support nonconscious expressions of  memory. Three 
PRS  subsystems are examined: visual word  form,  structural 
description, and auditory word form. Pertinent cognitive, neu- 
ropsychological, and neurobiological evidence is reviewed, al- 
ternative classificatory schemes are discussed, and important 
conceptual and terminological issues are considered. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past 25 years, questions concerning the na- 
ture and number of  memory systems have been at the 
forefront  of  cognitive, neuropsychological,  and neuro- 
biological research (for historical overview, see Polster, 
Nadel, & Schacter, 1991). In the study of  human memory, 
a key line of  evidence for multiple memory systems has 
been provided by investigations concerned with the de- 
scriptive distinction between explicit and implicit forms 
of  memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987). Ex- 
plicit memory refers to  intentional or conscious recol- 
lection of prior experiences, as assessed in the laboratory 
by traditional tests of  recall or recognition; implicit mem- 
ory,  by  contrast, refers to  changes  in  performance  or 
behavior that are produced by prior experiences on tests 
that do not require any intentional  or conscious recol- 
lection of  those  experiences.  The distinction  between 
explicit and implicit memory  is  similar to  distinctions 
between memoy with awareness vs. memoy without 
awareness (Jacoby  & Witherspoon,  1982), declarative 
memory vs. nondeclarative memoy (Squire, 1992), and 
direct memory vs. indirect rnemoy (Johnson & Hasher, 
1987). However,  these  distinctions  are used  less  fre- 
quently in the literature than is the explicitlimplicit dis- 
tinction,  and  there are various  reasons  to  prefer  the 
explicithmplicit contrast over alternative terms (Roedi- 
ger, 1990). 
The explicitlimplicit distinction is a descnjwive one that 
contrasts two different ways in which memory for pre- 
vious experience can be expressed; it does not refer to, 
or necessarily imply the existence of, distinct underlying 
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memory systems. However, interest in the relation  be- 
tween explicit and implicit forms of  memory has been 
sparked by demonstrations of  striking dissociations be- 
tween the two that do indeed suggest that different un- 
derlying  systems are involved  in  explicit  and  implicit 
memory,  respectively. Thus, for  example, it  has  been 
known for many years that amnesic patients exhibit ro- 
bust and sometimes normal learning of  various percep- 
tual,  motor,  and cognitive  skills  despite  impaired  or 
absent explicit memory for having acquired them (e.g., 
Cohen & Squire, 1980; Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968). 
Amnesic patients can also exhibit classical conditioning 
effects despite poor explicit memory (Daum, Channon, 
& Canavar, 1989; Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1979), and 
acquire knowledge  needed to  perform complex com- 
puter-related tasks despite the absence of any recollec- 
tion for having previously performed the tasks (Glisky, 
Schacter, & Tulving, 1986; Glisky & Schacter, 1987, 1988, 
1989). 
Perhaps the most intensively studied form of  implicit 
memory has come to be known as repetition or direct 
priming: the facilitated identification of  perceptual  ob- 
jects from reduced cues as a consequence of  a specific 
prior  exposure to  an object (e.g., Tulving & Schacter, 
1990). Priming can be thought of  as a form of  implicit 
memory in the sense that it can occur independently of 
any conscious or explicit recollection of  a previous en- 
counter with a stimulus. Thus, amnesic patients can show 
entirely normal priming as a consequence of a recent 
encounter with a word or object, despite impaired or 
even absent explicit memory for the word or object; and 
studies of nonamnesic, normal subjects have shown that 
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explicit memory in different and even opposite ways (for 
reviews, see Richardson-Klavehn  & Bjork, 1988;  Roediger, 
1990; Schacter, 1987; Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993; 
Shimamura, 1986). These and other observations indicate 
that the kind of  information about a recently encountered 
word or object that supports priming is quite different 
from the kind of  information that supports explicit rec- 
ollection for an encounter with the word or  object. More- 
over,  priming  has  also  been  dissociated  from  skill 
learning: studies of  dementia indicate that patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease show impaired  priming and intact 
motor skill learning, whereas patients with Huntington’s 
disease show the opposite pattern (e.g., Butters, Heindel, 
& Salmon, 1990). A number of  investigators have argued 
further that priming is the expression of a neurocognitive 
system  that  differs functionally  and neuroanatomically 
from  the  neurocognitive system  that  supports explicit 
remembering and skill learning, respectively (cf., Cohen, 
1984; Schacter, 1985, 1990; Butters et  al., 1990; Squire, 
1987, 1992; Tulving, 1985; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). 
This  article  examines  in some detail  one such  pro- 
posal, namely, that priming reflects, to a very large extent, 
the  operations  of  a  perceptual  representation  system 
(PRS) that can function independently of  the episodic or 
declarative memory system that supports explicit mem- 
ory (Schacter, 1990, 1992; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). PRS 
refers to a class of  domain-specific subsystems, based in 
cortical regions, that process and represent information 
about the form and structure, but not the meaning and 
other associative properties, of  words and objects. This 
article will focus on delineating and evaluating charac- 
teristics of, and evidence for, three PRS subsystems: visual 
word  form, structural  description,  and auditory  word 
form. Although they probably do not constitute an ex- 
haustive list of  PRS  subsystems, various kinds of  evidence 
about  them  is  available, including  data  from  priming 
studies. Each of  the subsystems differs from the others 
in  several ways,  but  all  share  common  features:  they 
operate at apresemantic level, that is, at a level of  pro- 
cessing that does not involve access to the meanings of 
words or objects, and they are involved in nonconscious 
expressions of  memory for previous experiences. After 
discussing pertinent issues and results at some length, I 
will conclude by considering briefly alternative concep- 
tualizations of  PRS subsystems and the relation between 
perceptual and conceptual forms of  priming. 
PRS  SUBSYSTEMS AND PRIMING 
Visual Word Form System 
The term  “visual word form system” was first used by 
Warrington and Shallice (1980) in the context of  their 
research  on patients  suffering  from  a  type of reading 
impairment known as letter-by-letter reading. Warrington 
and Shallice (1980) proposed that the deficit in at least 
some of  these patients could be attributed to the break- 
down of  a system that represents information about the 
visual  and orthographic form of  words.  Evidence that 
such a system operates at a presemantic level is provided 
by studies that have focused on brain-damaged patients 
who maintain relatively intact abilities to read words yet 
exhibit  little or no understanding  of  them (cf. Sartori, 
Masterson, &Job, 1987;  Schwartz, Saffran, & Marin, 1980). 
Importantly, such patients can read words with irregular 
spellings, thereby indicating that they can gain access to 
the representations in the word form system (see Schac- 
ter,  1990, for  further  elaboration).  Data  from  neuro- 
imaging  studies  using  positron  emission  tomography 
(PET)  suggest that  the visual  form system is based  in 
regions of  extrastriate occipital cortex and is  neuroana- 
tomically distinct from brain regions subserving semantic 
processing (e.g., Petersen et al., 1989). 
Several lines of  evidence have led to the proposal that 
the visual word form system subserves priming effects 
on so-called data driven or perceptually based implicit 
memory  tasks, such  as stem  or fragment  completion, 
where subjects provide the first word that comes to mind 
in response to three-letter stems or  graphemic fragments, 
and perceptual  or word identijication, where subjects 
attempt to  identi@ briefly presented  words. One such 
line of  evidence is that amnesic patients  show normal 
priming of  familiar words and word pairs on completion, 
identification, and similar tasks (cf. Cermak et al., 1985; 
Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Moscovitch, 1982; Schac- 
ter, 1985; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; Tulving, Hayman, 
& Macdonald,  1991; Warrington  & Weiskrantz, 1974). 
These results are consistent with the proposal that visual 
word priming is mediated by a perceptual system based 
in posterior cortical regions, because the critical sites of 
brain damage in amnesic patients  typically involve the 
limbic system and medial temporal lobe structures; pos- 
terior cortex is spared in the amnesic syndrome (e.g., 
Rozin, 1976; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992; Weis- 
krantz, 1985). 
Further evidence from the study of  amnesia that bears 
on this  idea  has  been provided  by  studies  that  have 
examined whether amnesic patients show intact priming 
of  novel word forms-that  is, nonwords (e.g., numdy) 
that do not  have preexisting  memory  representations. 
Such effects, which have been shown in normal subjects 
(e.g., Feustel, Shffrin, & Salasoo,  1983; Rueckl,  1990), 
provide evidence against the idea that priming  is  me- 
diated simply by the activation of  preexisting represen- 
tations,  and  instead  suggest  the  creation  of  a  novel 
perceptual  representation  by  the  word  form  system 
(Schacter, 1990). Accordingly, if priming of  verbal items 
in amnesic patients is indeed mediated by an intact word 
form system, such patients should show priming for non- 
words as well as familiar words. Although several studies 
have reported impaired or absent priming of  nonwords 
in  some amnesic patients (i.e., Korsakoff  patients  and 
demented subjects; cf. Cermak et al., 1985; Diamond & 
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search has provided  clear evidence that  non-Korsakoff 
amnesics, and even some Korsakoff patients, can show 
normal or near-normal priming of  nonwords under ap- 
propriate experimental conditions (cf. Cermak, Verfael- 
lie, Milberg, Letourneau, & Blackford, 1991; Gabrieli & 
Keane, 1988;  Gordon, 1988; Haist, Musen, & Squire, 1991; 
Musen & Squire, 1991; for detailed review, see Bowers 
& Schacter, 1992). Thus, the weight of  evidence is con- 
sistent with  the proposition that  a spared visual word 
form system supports priming in amnesic patients. 
A second line of  evidence that bears on the word form 
system  hypothesis  has  been  provided  by  experiments 
examining the effects of  semantic vs. nonsemantic study 
tasks on priming and explicit memory. It has been known 
since the initiation of  research in the levels of  processing 
framework during the 1970s that explicit recall and rec- 
ognition of  a list of  target words is much higher following 
semantic  study  tasks  (e.g., judging  the  meaning  of  a 
word) than nonsemantic study tasks (e.g., counting the 
number of  vowels and consonants in a word; see Craik 
& Tulving, 1975). Many studies that have been done since 
have shown that the same manipulations have little or 
no effect on priming in such data-driven implicit tests as 
stem completion (Bowers & Schacter, 1990; Graf & Man- 
dler,  1984), fragment  completion  (Roediger,  Weldon, 
Stadler, & Riegler, 1992), and perceptual  identification 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). 
The  foregoing  findings  are important  because  they 
provide support for the idea that priming is a preseman- 
tic phenomenon:  if visual word priming depends on a 
form-based  system  that  does  not  represent  a  word’s 
meaning, then it makes sense that semantic study tasks 
that  improve explicit memory do not confer the same 
benefit  on priming.  It  is  therefore  worth  noting  that 
conditions  do exist  in which  the magnitude  of  visual 
word priming is increased significantly by semantic study 
processing  relative  to  nonsemantic  study  processing 
(e.g., Bowers  & Schacter,  1990). However,  the results 
from  Bowers  and  Schacter’s  experiments  suggest 
strongly that when such effects are observed, they can 
be attributed to the use of  explicit memory strategies by 
subjects who have “caught on” concerning the relation 
between the implicit task and the study list. Through the 
use  of  a  postexperimental  questionnaire, Bowers  and 
Schacter determined that subjects who exhibited aware- 
ness of  the relation between the completion test and the 
study list showed higher completion rates following se- 
mantic than nonsemantic  study tasks, whereas subjects 
who remained unaware of  the study-test  relation showed 
equivalent priming following the two study tasks. 
A third line of  evidence bearing on the nature of  the 
system that subserves visual word priming comes from 
experiments  in  which  perceptual  attributes  of  target 
items are changed between study and test. The argument 
here is that if a visually based system plays a major role 
in priming, then the magnitude of  the effect should be 
reduced when relevant perceptual attributes are changed 
between study and test. Various manipulations have been 
used to  evaluate this proposal, and a range of  experi- 
mental outcomes has been observed, including findings 
that study-to-test changes in perceptual attributes of  tar- 
get items either reduce or eliminate priming (for review 
and discussion, see Kirsner, Dunn, & Standen, 1989;  Roe- 
diger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; Schacter, 1990; Schacter, 
Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993). For the present purposes, we 
focus on the theoretical implications of  results from two 
types of  stimulus transformations: (1) modality shifts and 
(2) changes in the format of  target words. 
Experiments  that  have examined  effects of  modality 
shifts (i.e., target  words  are presented  auditorily  and 
tested visually) have yielded  a relatively consistent pat- 
tern of  results: priming on  completion, identification, and 
similar  tasks  is  always  reduced, and sometimes  elimi- 
nated, by study-test  modality shifts (cf. Graf, Shimamura, 
& Squire, 1985;  Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Clarke & Morton, 
1983; Kirsner & Smith, 1974; Morton, 1979; Roediger & 
Blaxton, 1987). The observed reduction in priming as a 
consequence of  modality shift supports the visual word 
form system hypothesis. However, the fact that significant 
cross-modal priming  is  typically observed, particularly 
with stem- and fragment-completion tests, suggests that 
word priming is  not based entirely on visuaVperceptua1 
processes, a point that will be elaborated on later. 
The question  of  whether visual word  priming is  af- 
fected  by  study-test  changes  in  the specific format of 
target items (e.g., typefont, upperAower case) is of  great 
interest theoretically: If  priming is reduced or eliminated 
by alterations  in  perceptual  format, we have evidence 
that the system underlying visual word priming computes 
highly specific perceptual  representations of  the partic- 
ular word tokens encountered on a study list; if priming 
is unaffected by such changes, we have evidence that the 
system operates at a more abstract level. Moreover, com- 
parative analysis of  which perceptual features do and do 
not  impair  priming when  changed between study and 
test could provide rather precise information concerning 
the representational properties of  the system underlying 
priming. A great deal of  experimental  effort has been 
devoted to  this issue, and has yielded  a rather  mixed 
pattern of  results. On the one hand, a number of  studies 
have provided evidence that transformations of  typefont, 
case, and orthographic  structure can have a significant 
impact on priming (e.g., Gardiner, 1988;  Jacoby & Hay- 
man, 1987;  Hayman & Tulving, 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977;  Whit- 
tlesea, 1990). On the other hand, however, other studies 
have failed to obtain effects of  similar manipulations (e.g., 
Carr, Brown, & Charambolous, 1989; Clarke & Morton, 
1983; Tardif & Craik, 1989). 
Although some of  the conflicting results may be attrib- 
utable to subtle aspects of  experimental procedures (cf. 
Carr et al., 1989; Whittlesea, 1990), recent studies have 
helped to clarify matters by elucidating, within the same 
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test transformation of  perceptual features do and do not 
impair priming. Thus, Graf and Ryan  (1990) found that 
study-to-test changes in typefont reduced priming on a 
word  identification  test  when  the study  task  required 
subjects to  focus on perceptual  features of  words, but 
not when the study task focused on word meaning (cf. 
Jacoby, Levy, & Steinbach, 1992). Marsolek, Kosslyn, and 
Squire (1992) found that changing case of target words 
between study and test reduced stem completion prim- 
ing when test stems were presented to the right hemi- 
sphere (via the left visual field) but not when test stems 
were  presented  to  the left  hemisphere  (via  the right 
visual field). 
These findings indicate that a visual encounter with a 
word does not necessarily or inevitably create a highly 
specific and novel of  representation  of  it  in the word 
form system, but  also indicate that  specific perceptual 
representations  are created  under  appropriate  condi- 
tions. The Graf and Ryan  (1990)  data suggest that the 
system  creates  novel  perceptual  representations  only 
when initial processing focuses on visual characteristics 
of  a word, and perhaps only when unusual typefonts are 
encountered. The Marsolek et al. (1992) data suggest that 
this  effect  may  depend  on right  hemisphere  involve- 
ment-that  is, the right hemisphere may constitute the 
substrate  of  the novel  perceptual  representations  that 
produce format-specific priming effects. Marsolek et al. 
have suggested further that it is necessary to fractionate 
the word form system into two further subsystems: a left 
hemisphere subsystem that computes abstract word form 
representations  (i.e., it produces  one output for many 
inputs) and a right hemisphere subsystem that computes 
perceptually specific word form representations (i.e., it 
produces a single output for a  particular  input).  They 
reasoned  that these two  computations are functionally 
incompatible  (Sherry  & Schacter, 1987ba system de- 
signed to perform one would have difficulty carrying out 
the other-and  hence must  be performed by  different 
subsystems.  We will return to this point later in the paper. 
Structural Description System 
The term structural description refers to a representation 
of  relations among parts of  an object that specifies the 
global form and structure of  the object (cf. Sutherland, 
1968; Winston, 1975). Several investigators have argued 
that structural descriptions are computed by a specific 
brain system-termed  the strmctural description system 
by Riddoch and Humphreys (1987tthat does not han- 
dle semantic-level information about the associative and 
functional properties of  objects (cf. Kosslyn, Flynn, Am- 
sterdam, & Wang,  1990; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; 
Warrington, 1975, 1982). We  (e.g., Schacter, 1990, 1992; 
Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990; Tulving & Schacter, 
1990) have suggested that the structural description sys- 
tem can be viewed as a PRS subsystem that is involved 
in various priming effects that have been observed in the 
domain of  visual  object  processing. As with  the visual 
word form system, evidence that the structural descrip- 
tion  system operates at  a  presemantic  level has  been 
provided in the first instance by neuropsychological stud- 
ies of  brain-damaged patients. Specifically, a number of 
investigators have described patients who have  severe 
deficits in gaining access to semantic information about 
visual objects, but exhibit relatively intact access to per- 
ceptuaVstructura1 knowledge of  the same objects (e.g., 
Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Sartori &Job, 1988; War- 
rington  & Taylor,  1978). Such  patients  perform  quite 
poorly when required to  name pictured  objects, when 
tested for functional knowledge of  what a visual object 
is used for, or when queried regarding associative knowl- 
edge of  where an object  is typically encountered. But 
they  perform  relatively well when given  tests that tap 
knowledge of  object structure, such as matching different 
views of  common objects or  distinguishing between real 
and nonsense objects. 
There has been a good deal less work on  visual object 
priming than on visual word priming, but  as with the 
visual word form system, three main kinds of  evidence 
implicate the  structural  description  system as a  major 
substrate of  priming: spared implicit memory in amnesic 
patients, invariance of  priming across semantic vs. nonse- 
mantic study task manipulations, and effects of  study-to- 
test transformation of  various stimulus properties. I will 
first consider each type of  evidence in the context of  an 
experimental paradigm that my colleagues and I devel- 
oped to test the structural description system hypothesis, 
and then briefly note pertinent data from other, related 
implicit memory tasks. 
The paradigm that we have developed for examining 
priming  of  structural  descriptions  makes  use  of  two- 
dimensional line drawings that depict unfamiliar three- 
dimensional visual objects (see Fig. 1). Although all of 
the objects are novel, half of  them are structurally pos- 
sible-they  could  exist  in  three-dimensional  form- 
whereas the other half are structurally impossible-they 
contain surface and edge violations that would prohibit 
them from  existing in three-dimensions  (see Schacter, 
Cooper, & Delaney, 1990, for more details on objects). 
In a typical experiment, subjects initially study a list of 
possible and impossible objects by making various kinds 
of  judgments about them, and are then given an object 
decision test to assess priming, or a yesho recognition 
test to  assess explicit memory. For the object decision 
test, previously studied and nonstudied objects are pre- 
sented quite briefly (e.g., 50-100  msec), one at a time, 
and subjects decide whether they are possible or impos- 
sible. The  reasoning  is  that  (1) making  the  possible/ 
impossible object decision requires access to  informa- 
tion about three-dimensional structure of  an object, and 
(2) to the extent that subjects have acquired information 
about object structure during the study trial, object de- 
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explicit memory for novel objects. The drawings in the upper row 
depict possible objects that could exist in three-dimensional form. 
The drawings in the lower row depict impossible objects that contain 
structural violations that would prohibit them from actually existing 
in three-dimensional form. See text for further explanation. 
cisions should be more accurate for previously studied 
objects than for nonstudied objects. An initial experiment 
revealed that significant priming is observed on the ob- 
ject  decision  task  following a  study task  that  requires 
analysis of  global  object structure but  not following a 
study task that focuses attention on local object features 
(Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). Moreover, the prim- 
ing effect was observed for structurally possible objects 
but not for structurally impossible objects. The failure to 
observe priming of  impossible objects has been repli- 
cated many times, and may indicate that it is difficult to 
form an internal representation  of  the global structure 
of an impossible object (see Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 
1990; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Tharan, & Peterson, 
1991). 
The  foregoing findings  are consistent with  the idea 
that priming on the object decision task is supported by 
newly formed structural descriptions of  previously stud- 
ied objects. Evidence that the priming effect reflects the 
operation  of  a  presemantic  structural  description  sys- 
tem-distinct  from  episodic  memory-is  provided  by 
experiments in which we have compared encoding tasks 
that require processing of  object structure (e.g., deciding 
whether  an object faces primarily  to the left  or to  the 
right)  with  encoding  tasks  that  require  processing of 
semantic and functional properties of  objects. Figure 2 
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Figure 2.  Summary of  two  experiments examining object decision 
priming (OD) and recognition memory (RN)  using the possible and 
impossible figures presented in Figure 1. Only data for possible ob- 
jects are shown, because no priming of  impossible objects was ob- 
served in either experiment. The left panel presents results from an 
experiment by Schacter, Cooper, and Delaney (1990) in which sub- 
jects initially either judged whether the object faces primarily to the 
left or to the right, or generated the name of  a real-world object that 
the target reminded them of  most. The figure presents priming 
scores from the object decision task that were computed by subtract- 
ing the proportion of  nonstudied possible objects classified correctly 
from the proportion of  studied possible objects classified correctly, 
and corrected recognition scores that were computed by subtracting 
“yes” responses to nonstudied objects (i.e., false alarms  j, from “yes” 
responses to studied objects (hits). The  right panel presents priming 
and corrected recognition scores from an experiment in which sub- 
jects performed either the left/right study task or a functional encod- 
ing task in which they judged whether an object would be best used 
as a tool or for support (Schacter & Cooper, 1991). 
displays the results of  two such experiments. The left- 
most panel depicts priming and recognition scores fol- 
lowing a structural  encoding task (lewright  judgment) 
and an elaborative encoding task that taps subjects’ se- 
mantic knowledge  of  real  world  objects  (they are re- 
quired to generate a verbal  label of  a common object 
that  each  drawing  reminds them  of  most).  A  striking 
crossover interaction was observed (Schacter, Cooper, & 
Delaney, 1990): Explicit  recognition  was  much  higher 
following elaborative than structural encoding, whereas 
the opposite pattern was found for object decision. In- 
deed, the elaborative task failed to  produce significant 
priming  on the object decision  task, a  finding  that  is 
probably attributable to the fact that subjects often based 
their elaborations on local, two-dimensional features of 
target  objects.  The  right-most  panel  shows  a  similar 
crossover interaction from an experiment in which the 
lewright  encoding  task was  compared  to  a  functional 
encoding task in which subjects decided whether target 
objects could be  best  used  as  a  tool  or for  support 
(Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan, 1991). 
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some priming, probably  because  making  the decision 
about function requires some analysis of  structure. 
These results are entirely consistent with the idea that 
object decision priming depends on a presemantic sys- 
tem that is dedicated to the analysis and representation 
of  object  structure, and does not  handle  information 
about the semantic and functional properties of  objects. 
We  have  also found  that  object  decision  priming was 
spared in a group of  amnesic patients who showed poor 
explicit memory for the objects  on a  recognition  test 
(Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & Rubens, 1991). This finding 
suggests that the priming  effect, and the structural de- 
scription system that supports it, are not critically depen- 
dent on the limbic structures that are typically damaged 
in amnesic patients. 
Further information  regarding the functional proper- 
ties and possible neuroanatomical basis of the structural 
description system is provided by experiments in which 
we  have examined  the effects on priming of  changing 
size, reflection, and picture plane orientation of  target 
objects between study and test. The results of  these ex- 
periments are relatively clear cut: study-to-test changes 
in size and 1eWright reflection of  objects have no effect 
on priming despite producing an impairment of recog- 
nition memory (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 
1992), whereas changing the picture plane orientation of 
target objects by 120,180,  or  240 degrees from a standard 
orientation eliminates priming and also reduces recog- 
nition memory substantially (Cooper, Schacter, & Moore, 
1991). This pattern of  results suggests that the structural 
description system computes object representations that 
do not  include information  about size or left-right  re- 
flection, but do include  information  that  specifies the 
relation between the parts of  an object on the one hand 
and its principal axis and reference frame on the other 
(Cooper et al., 1991, 1992). 
Data from other studies on priming of  nonverbal in- 
formation provide converging evidence on the foregoing 
points. Evidence for the presemantic nature of  priming 
has been  obtained on implicit tests  that  involve com- 
pleting fragments of  familiar pictures with the first object 
that comes to mind (Schacter, Delaney, & Merikle, 1990) 
or identifying novel dot patterns (Musen, 1991). Spared 
priming of  novel dot patterns has also been documented 
in amnesic patients (Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin, 
1990). And  invariance  of  priming  across  study-to-test 
changes in size and reflection has been documented in 
paradigm that involves naming and renaming pictures of 
familiar objects (Biederman & Cooper, 1992). 
Although relatively little information is available con- 
cerning the exact neural locus of  the structural descrip- 
tion system, the findings on size and reflection invariant 
priming have led to the proposal that regions of  inferior 
temporal cortex may be involved (Biederman & Cooper, 
1992; Cooper et al., 1992; Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & 
Rubens, 1991). This idea is  based to  a large extent on 
findings from single cell recordings and brain lesions in 
nonhuman primates indicating that inferior temporal re- 
gions are involved in the computation of  size and reflec- 
tion  invariant  object  representations  (for  review, see 
Plaut & Farah, 1990). It is  possible, of  course, that the 
precise neuroanatomical locus of  this system differs in 
monkey and man, but the human data on this point are 
not conclusive. Studies using PET  imaging should help 
to clarify the matter, and we are in the process of  com- 
pleting such a study with the possiblehmpossible object 
decision task. 
Auditory Word Form System 
The great majority of  research on priming and implicit 
memory has focused on visual paradigms and processes; 
there has been relatively little investigation of, and theo- 
rizing about, implicit memory in the auditory domain 
(see Schacter & Church, 1992, for review). Nevertheless, 
neuropsychological evidence on  auditory processing def- 
icits  has  revealed  a  fordsemantic dissociation  that  is 
similar in kind to those discussed in previous sections, 
and that implicates the existence of  a presemantic audi- 
tory  subsystem of  PRS.  Specifically, patients  have been 
identified who exhibit severe deficits in understandlng 
spoken language together with relatively intact abilities 
to  repeat  and  write-to-dictation  auditorily  presented 
words and sentences. In cases of word meaning deafness, 
the semantic deficit is modality specific; patients show 
relatively spared comprehension of  visual  inputs (e.g., 
Kohn & Friedman, 1986). In cases of  transcortical sen- 
sory  apkia,  comprehension  is  impaired  in  both  the 
auditory and visual  modalities  (e.g., Coslett, Roeltgen, 
Rothi, & Heilman, 1987). By  contrast, patients character- 
ized by pure word deafness exhibit selective deficits in 
repetition  of  spoken  words  (e.g.,  Metz-Lutz  &  Dahl, 
1984). Taken together, these observations point toward 
the existence of  a presemantic auditory word form sys- 
tem that is  dedicated to  the processing and representa- 
tion  of  acoustidphonological  information,  but  not 
semantic  information,  about  spoken  words  (Ellis  & 
Young, 1988). PET  studies suggest that regions of  poste- 
rior temporoparietal cortex may be involved in encoding 
of  phonological word forms (Peterson et al., 1989). 
Relatively little work has been done to link the auditory 
word form system with priming effects that have been 
observed on auditory implicit tests, but some data are 
available concerning two  of  the key issues discussed in 
previous sections: invariance of  priming as a function of 
semantic vs. nonsemantic encoding processes, and effects 
of  study-to-test changes in perceptual attributes of  targets 
on the magnitude of  priming. 
Several recent experiments from our laboratory have 
provided  evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  auditory 
priming  depends on a  presemantic  system. In  studies 
with college students, we have examined auditory prim- 
ing on two  tests that are quite similar to the perceptual 
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the visual domain: auditory word identification and au- 
ditory stem  completion  (Schacter & Church,  1992). In 
the  former task, subjects  hear  previously  studied  and 
nonstudied words that are masked by white noise, and 
attempt to identify them; in the latter task, subjects hear 
the initial syllable of  studied and nonstudied words, and 
respond with the first word that pops to mind (the syl- 
lable stimulus is created by editing a whole word utter- 
ance  on a  Macintosh system). To  investigate whether 
priming on these tasks depends on semantic-level pro- 
cesses, during the study phase of  the experiment subjects 
heard a series of  spoken words and either performed a 
semantic encoding task (e.g., rating the number of  mean- 
ings associated with the word) or a nonsemantic encod- 
ing task  (e.g., rating the clarity with which the speaker 
enunciated the word). Implicit and explicit memory were 
tested after brief  delays of  several minutes. A series of 
five experiments yielded a consistent pattern of  results: 
explicit memory was considerably higher following se- 
mantic than  nonsemantic  encoding tasks, whereas the 
magnitude of  priming on identification and completion 
tasks was  either less affected or entirely unaffected by 
the study task manipulation. 
Further evidence bearing on the hypothesis  that au- 
ditory priming  reflects the operation of  a presemantic 
system is provided  by a  recent study in which we as- 
sessed  priming  in  a  case  of  word  meaning  deafness 
(Schacter, McGlynn, Milberg, & Church, 1992). The pa- 
tient, J. p., suffered a large stroke-induced lesion within 
the  distribution of  the left middle cerebral artery that 
affected primarily  the anterior  portions  of  Wernicke’s 
area, largely sparing posterior  temporoparietal  cortex. 
He has great difficulty understanding spoken words. For 
example, J. P.  exhibits a severe impairment  on the au- 
ditory comprehension subtests of  the Boston Diagnostic 
Aphasia Examination, whereas he shows only mild defi- 
cits on subtests that assess repetition  of spoken words, 
writing to  dictation, or comprehension of  visual  input. 
If,  as  we  have  suggested, priming  on a  task  such  as 
auditory word identification is mediated by a preseman- 
tic system, then J. P.  should show robust priming despite 
his  semantic  impairment.  Using  the  identification-in- 
noise task from Schacter and Church (1992), we indeed 
observed intact priming in J. P.  relative to four matched 
control subjects (Fig. 3). 
While the foregoing results support the idea that au- 
ditory priming need not involve access to semantic rep- 
resentations, they do not indicate what kinds of  processes 
and representations  are involved in  the phenomenon. 
Evidence that priming  is  based  largely on an auditory 
perceptual system is provided by experiments on study/ 
test modality shifts: When target words are studied vis- 
ually,  priming  on  auditory  word  identification  (Ellis, 
1982; Jackson  & Morton,  1984) and stem  completion 
(Bassilli, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989) tasks is  reduced sig- 
nificantly relative to auditory study conditions. Given that 
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Figure 3.  Results of  an experiment that examined priming of  audi- 
tory word identification and explicit recognition memory in a patient 
with word meaning deafness (J. P.) and four matched controls 
(Schacter,  McGlynn, Milberg, & Church, 1992). The figure presents 
priming scores from the auditory identification task that were com- 
puted by  subtracting the proportion of  nonstudied words identified 
correctly from the proportion of studied words identified correctly, 
and corrected recognition scores that were computed by subtracting 
“yes”  responses to nonstudied words from “yes”  responses to studied 
words. J. P.’s comected recognition score was zero. 
a modality-specific auditory system plays a key role in 
priming, an important question concerns the nature of 
this system: Is auditory priming based on acoustic fea- 
tures of  spoken  input  that  are specific to  a  particular 
speaker, or is priming based on more abstract phono- 
logical representations that do not include speaker-spe- 
cific perceptual information? 
The issue was  addressed initially in experiments  by 
Jackson and Morton (1984), who examined priming on 
the auditory identification test when target words were 
spoken by the same voice at study and test, and when 
they were spoken by different voices (male vs. female) 
at study and test. They observed priming effects of  com- 
parable magnitude in the same- and different-voice con- 
ditions, and argued on this basis that priming depends 
entirely on abstract (but modality specific) representa- 
tions of  invariant phonological features of  spoken words. 
In experiments discussed earlier, Schacter and Church 
(1992) also found nonsignificant effects of  study-to-test 
changes in speaker’s voice on priming of  auditory iden- 
tification performance. In fact, Schacter and Church ob- 
served  voice-invariant  priming  even  following 
nonsemantic study tasks that focused subjects’ attention 
on characteristics of  speaker’s voice  (cf. Graf  & Ryan, 
1990). 
While the foregoing results are consistent with the idea 
that auditory priming depends on a system that repre- 
sents abstract phonological word forms, it is also possible 
that the absence of  voice-change effects in the Jackson 
and Morton (1984) and Schacter and Church (1992) ex- 
periments reflects idiosyncratic features of  the auditory 
identification test  that was  used  in  these experiments. 
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of white noise on the identification test may have inter- 
fered with processing those components of  the acoustic 
waveform that provide access to voice information. Con- 
sistent with this suggestion, when we examined the effect 
of changing speaker’s voice on priming of  the  auditory 
stem completion task-which  does not involve the use 
of white  noise-significant  voice  change  effects were 
observed in each of  two  experiments. Data from one of 
those  experiments  are presented  in  Figure  4, which 
shows that priming was lower in the different-voice than 
in the same-voice condition following both semantic and 
nonsemantic encoding tasks. The voice change manipu- 
lation had  no effect on explicit  memory, whereas the 
semantic vs.  nonsemantic  study task  manipulation  af- 
fected explicit memory but not priming. To ascertain that 
the presence/absence of  white noise is the critical factor 
determining whether voice changes effects on priming 
are or are not  observed, we performed  an additional 
experiment with auditory stem completion that was iden- 
tical in all respects to the previous one except for one 
change: stems were masked by white noise. Under these 
conditions, we observed significant priming but no effect 
of  voice change (Schacter and Church, 1992). 
This general pattern  of  results  is similar  to that ob- 
served  in  studies of  visual  word  priming:  priming  is 
influenced by changes in perceptual  features of  target 
words in some experimental conditions but not in oth- 
ers. The critical issue for the present purposes concerns 
the theoretical implications of such observations for un- 
derstanding the kind of  subsystem that subserves audi- 
tory  priming. Schacter and Church (1992) offered  one 
speculative possibility that implicates left and right hemi- 
Figure 4. Results of  an experiment that examined priming of  audi- 
tory stem completion and explicit cued recall following word mean- 
ing and voice clarity encoding tasks (Schacter & Church, 1992). 
Target words were spoken in the same voice or a different voice at 
study and test. The figure presents priming scores and corrected re- 
call scores that were computed by subtracting the proportion of  non- 
studied target words that subjects provided from the proportion of 
studied target words that they provided. 
sphere subsystems in abstract and perceptually specific 
components of  auditory priming, respectively. The rea- 
soning is relatively straightforward, and turns on three 
kinds of  observations. First, a  number of  investigators 
have argued that the left hemisphere represents abstract 
or categorical  phonological  information,  whereas  the 
right  hemisphere  represents  perceptually  specific 
“acoustic gestalts,” including information about speaker’s 
voice  (cf.  Gazzaniga, 1975; Lieberman,  1982; Mann  & 
Lieberman, 1983; Sidtis & Gazzaniga, 1981;  ZaideI, 1985). 
Second, several types of  empirical evidence link the right 
hemisphere with  access to  voice  information: patients 
with right hemisphere lesions are characterized by voice 
recognition impairments (e.g., Van  Lancker & Kreiman, 
1987) and by difficulties in  processing  voice  prosody 
(e.g., Ross,  1981); and studies of  normal subjects using 
dichotic listening techniques have shown a left-ear (i.e., 
right hemisphere) advantage for processing intonational 
contours (e.g., Blumstein & Cooper, 1974). Third, evi- 
dence from  split-brain patients  indicates  that the right 
hemisphere  is greatly impaired-more  than the left- 
when  required to  process  spoken words  that are pre- 
sented in background noise (Zaidel, 1978). 
Given that  voice-change  effects in  auditory priming 
appear  to be dependent  on white  noise, and that the 
right  hemisphere  represents  voice  information  and  is 
especially sensitive to background  noise, it is possible 
that voice change effects are not observed when target 
items are masked by noise because a right hemisphere 
subsystem has been effectively excluded from contrib- 
uting to task performance. Stated slightly differently, au- 
ditory priming may  depend both on a left hemisphere 
subsystem that  represents  abstract  phonological  infor- 
mation and a right hemisphere subsystem that represents 
voice-specific acoustic  information. When  both  subsys- 
tems can contribute to implicit task performance (i.e., if 
no white  noise  is  used),  voice  change  effects will  be 
observed; but when only the left hemisphere subsystem 
can contribute (i.e.,  if white noise eliminates right hemi- 
sphere contributions), voice change effects will not be 
observed. The general idea that two  lateralized subsys- 
tems are involved in auditory priming is quite similar to 
that offered by Marsolek et al. (1992) to account for the 
finding that perceptual specificity effects in visual word 
priming were observed when test stems were presented 
to  the right hemisphere, whereas abstract priming was 
observed when stems were presented to the left  hemi- 
sphere. 
It  must be emphasized, of  course, that Schacter and 
Church’s argument for right hemisphere involvement in 
voice specific priming is based entirely on indirect evi- 
dence and hence must be treated cautiously. To test this 
hypothesis more directly, we have recently initiated ex- 
periments that use dichotic listening techniques to  ex- 
amine voice change effects on priming. A large body of 
literature indicates that with dichotic presentation, verbal 
stimuli presented to the right ear (i.e.,  left hemisphere) 
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presented  to  the left  ear  (e.g., Bryden,  1988; Wexler, 
1988) and, as noted earlier, there is some evidence that 
voice information  is  processed  more efficiently by the 
left  ear  (i.e., right  hemisphere;  Blumstein  & Cooper, 
1974). Accordingly, we hypothesized that priming effects 
would be reduced by study-to-test changes in speaker’s 
voice when test stimuli were presented to  the left ear, 
but not when they were presented to the right ear. In 
the one experiment that we have completed (Schacter, 
Aminoff, & Church, 1992), subjects initially made clarity- 
of-enunciation judgments concerning a series of  words 
that were spoken by male or female voices. They were 
then given a dichotic version of  the auditory stem com- 
pletion task: Stems representing studied or nonstudied 
target words were presented to either the left or right 
ear, a  nontarget  distractor  stem was  presented  to  the 
opposite ear (to inhibit the hemisphere ipsilateral to the 
target stimulus), and subjects were instructed to respond 
with the first word that came to mind in response to the 
stem presented to either the left ear or the right ear (left 
ear and right ear presentations were ordered randomly 
for individual subjects, and they were cued to the appro- 
priate ear on each test trial). Results indicated that for 
right-ear  presentations,  virtually  identical  amounts  of 
priming were observed in same- and different-voice con- 
ditions, whereas for left-ear presentations, more priming 
was  observed  in  the same-voice than  in  the different- 
voice condition. Indeed, left-ear presentations  did  not 
yield  a significant priming  effect in the different-voice 
condition.  In  view of  the fact that  data  from  dichotic 
listening experiments are sometimes variable across pro- 
cedures and subject populations (e.g.,  Harshman, 1988), 
these  data must  be treated  cautiously pending replica- 
tion. Nevertheless, they support the idea that two  later- 
alized  subsystems  are  involved  in  voice-specific  and 
voice-nonspecific components of  auditory priming. 
Taken together, experiments examining semantic vs. 
nonsemantic study processing and study-to-test changes 
in speaker’s voice support the idea that presemantic PRS 
subsystems support auditory  priming.  Note,  however, 
that no published studies of  amnesic patients are avail- 
able that bear directly on these hypotheses. In a recently 
completed experiment, we examined auditory priming 
in  a mixed group of  Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff am- 
nesic  patients  (Schacter,  Church, & Treadwell,  1992). 
Using the auditory identification test and the semantic/ 
nonsemantic  study  tasks  developed  by  Schacter  and 
Church (1992, Experiment 2), we observed entirely nor- 
mal priming in the amnesic group. These results provide 
converging evidence for the PRS account. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: 
SYSTEMS AND SUBSYSTEMS 
This  article  has  focused  on the contributions  of  pre- 
semantic perceptual  subsystems  to  priming  effects on 
data-driven implicit memory tests in visual and auditory 
domains. However,  it  can  be  questioned  whether the 
entire priming effect on such tasks can be attributed to 
perceptual processes. As  noted earlier, experiments ex- 
amining the effects of  study-to-test modality shifts have 
reported reduced priming in cross-modality conditions 
relative to within-modality conditions, but have generally 
documented significant cross-modal effects; priming is 
rarely eliminated by modality shifts (for review, see fir- 
sner et al., 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). Some au- 
thors  have  assumed  that  the existence of  cross-modal 
priming necessarily implies the involvement of  semantic 
or conceptual  processes  in  priming  (e.g., Hirshman, 
Snodgrass, Mindes, & Feenan, 1990;  Keane, Gabrieli, Fen- 
nema, Growdon, & Corkm, 1991). For example, Keane 
et al. (1991) have argued that the existence of  significant 
cross-modal priming on the stem completion task indi- 
cates that a IexicaVsemantic system plays a role in stem 
completion priming. If  their reasoning is correct, it will 
be necessary to  qualify the statement that priming  on 
stem completion (and other tasks that include a signifi- 
cant  cross-modal component)  is  mediated  entirely  by 
subsystems that operate at a presemantic level (see also 
Masson and Macleod, 1992). 
There  are, however,  some grounds  for  questioning 
the conclusion that cross-modal priming necessarily im- 
plicates  the  involvement  of  semantic-level  processes. 
Kirsner et  al. (1989), for instance, have suggested two 
alternative sources of  cross-modal priming on visual im- 
plicit tests: phonological representations or amodal “pro- 
duction  records”  (i,e,, motor  programs  involved  in 
response production) that are activated by  an auditory 
study presentation. Their own review of  the literature 
led Kirsner et al. to favor the production record hypoth- 
esis.  Similarly, McClelland and  Pring  (1991)  provided 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that cross-modal ef- 
fects on priming of  auditory stem completion are attrib- 
utable to phonological processes. Whether or not these 
ideas about  the basis of  cross-modal priming are ulti- 
mately correct, they underscore the point that the pres- 
ence  of  cross-modal  priming  need  not  signal  the 
involvement of  conceptual or semantic processes. Never- 
theless, it is clear that priming can be observed on tasks 
that involve semantic processing, such as answering gen- 
eral  knowledge  questions  or producing  category  in- 
stances in response to a category label. The magnitude 
of  priming on such tasks is increased by semantic relative 
to  nonsemantic study processing  (Hamann, 1990) and 
can  be  dissociated  from  perceptually  based  priming 
(Blaxton, 1989). These kinds of  observations indicate that 
conceptual priming is based on different processes than 
perceptual priming (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, 1990; Tul- 
ving & Schacter, 1990&processes  that occur outside of 
PRS-although  the precise  locus of  the effects has not 
been well specified. 
This article has focused on three PRS  subsystems: vis- 
ual word form, structural description, and auditory word 
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was postulated  on the basis of  neuropsychological  ob- 
servations concerning patients who exhibit formheman- 
tic dissociations within a particular  domain; the role of 
that subsystem in priming was inferred from patterns of 
effects of  various experimental and subject variables. The 
fact  that  the PRS  account  is  supported  by  converging 
evidence from independent research domains is an im- 
portant strength of  this general approach (see Schacter, 
1992). However, results were also considered that sup- 
port  a further  fractionation  of  the visual  and auditory 
word form  systems into  lateralized  subsystems: a left- 
hemisphere component  that  operates on abstract (but 
modality-specific) word  form information, and a right- 
hemisphere component that operates on highly specific 
visual or auditory perceptual information. Experimental 
evidence supporting the idea that such lateralized sub- 
systems contribute differentially to priming in visual and 
auditory domains is still rather scanty, and will require 
further  replication  and examination. Nonetheless,  it  is 
worth emphasizing that there is converging evidence for 
lateralized subsystems of  the kind that have been pos- 
tulated on the basis of  the priming results: in the visual 
domain, recent PET data are consistent with the idea that 
left posterior regions are involved in processing abstract 
orthographic  information  whereas  right  posterior  re- 
gions are involved in processing specific perceptual fea- 
tures of  words and nonwords (Petersen, Fox, Snyder, & 
Raichle, 1990); and in the auditory domain, several kinds 
of  evidence  discussed  earlier  (see  also  Schacter  & 
Church, 1992) suggest the existence of  abstract and spe- 
cific auditory subsystems. 
If we accept for the moment the idea that lateralized 
perceptual subsystems contribute to priming, questions 
arise concerning the nature of  their relation to the three 
subsystems that have been the focus of  this article: Is  it 
necessary to fractionate the visual word form, structural 
description, and auditory word form systems into left- 
hemisphere and right-hemisphere  subsystems, yielding 
a total of  six distinct PKS  subsystems? Or is it more useful 
to think in terms of  a visual form system and an auditory 
form system that can each be fractionated into left- and 
right-hemisphere components, yielding  four basic  PRS 
subsystems?  Although we cannot provide conclusive an- 
swers to  these questions at this early stage of  research 
and theorizing, they raise fundamental problems that will 
require careful analysis. It is likely that progress in think- 
ing about such questions with respect to implicit memory 
will  be facilitated by  considering  them  in  relation  to 
debates  in  cognitive  neuropsychology  concerning the 
nature  and number of  visual  and auditory recognition 
systems (e.g., Farah, 1991; Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987; 
Ellis & Young, 1988). 
Questions concerning relations among PKS  subsystems 
raise  a more general  issue  concerning the use of  the 
terms “system”  and “subsystem” in discussion of  PRS and 
multiple memory  systems more generally. Throughout 
this article and elsewhere, I have referred to a perceptual 
representation system and to visual word form, structural 
description, and auditory word form subsystems. The lat- 
ter  term  is  used  to  reflect  the idea  that  each  of  the 
subsystems performs distinct input-output computations 
within a particular  domain. For  example, the kinds of 
modality-specific computations performed by the visual 
and auditory word  form subsystems, and the memory 
representations  that  they  create, must  differ from one 
another because of  fundamental differences in the nature 
of  visual and acoustic inputs to these subsystems. Simi- 
larly, as noted earlier, the computational case for postu- 
lating lateralized subsystems rests on the notion that the 
computations performed  by abstract  (left hemisphere) 
and specific (right  hemisphere)  perceptual  subsystems 
are functionally incompatible with one another (Marso- 
lek et al., 1992;  Sherry & Schacter, 1987). In view of  these 
considerations, one could argue that it is more accurate 
to refer simply to perceptual representation systems than 
to invoke a monolithic perceptual representation system. 
I have indeed used the terms “perceptual representation 
systems” and  “perceptual representation  system” inter- 
changeably (Schacter, 1990), and the spirit of  theorizing 
presented in this article and elsewhere is entirely con- 
sistent with such usage. The main reason for invoking 
the term perceptual representation system is to empha- 
size the notion that all of  the various subsystems are tied 
together by common features: they are cortically based, 
operate at  a presemantic level on domain-specific per- 
ceptual information, and support nonconscious expres- 
sions of  memory. Thus, the term subsystem is  used  to 
refer to a neurally instantiated input-ouput  unit that per- 
forms certain kinds of  memory functions, whereas the 
term system is used at a more abstract level of  description 
to  refer to  common features of  a class of  subsystems. 
Further consideration of  the ways  in  which  these and 
other terms  are used  will  be necessary  not  only with 
respect to the particular issues addressed in this article, 
but also in more general discussions and debates con- 
cerning the nature and number of  memory systems. 
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